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Abstract 
Given the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the development process, one of the 
most important challenges facing Africa is how to attract FDI. A number of attempts 
which have been made have been unsuccessful because of various factors that work 
against the business environment for FDI. Africa’s image as a high-risk investment 
region has to be dispelled, as the flow of FDI is highly sensitive to economic and political 
risks. Fiscal incentives, the most popular instrument for attracting FDI in Africa, have 
failed to deliver the expected increase in FDI inflows. What is needed is political and 
macroeconomic stability at the national and regional levels, property rights protection 
and other investment-supporting regulations and improvements in infrastructure and 
service support systems. 
 
1. Introduction 
As early as the 1960s, Vernon and other economists recognized the importance of 
locational determinants in the foreign direct investment (FDI) decision making process, 
especially in the location of US firms in advanced developed countries (see Vernon 1966; 
Wells 1972). In the 1970s, however, attention was switched to the firm-specific 
characteristics of the investor, where attention was focused on the ‘why’ question; why 
firms choose to set up production facilities in a foreign location rather than exporting (see 
Caves 1982; 1996). 
 
Since the 1970s, the emphasis on the ownership-advantages of firms has continued to 
drive academic debate and research on FDI, but recently there has been a renewed 
interest in the locational aspects of FDI, which complements the competitive ownership 
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factors of firms and their modes of market entry (Dunning 1998). This approach takes 
into consideration “the relationship between trade and FDI, and the economic structure 
and dynamic comparative advantage of regions and countries” (ibid, p.46). 
 
The rest of this paper is presented as follows. In section 2, we discuss the motives for 
undertaking FDI by multinational enterprises and for seeking FDI by less developed 
countries (LDCs). Section 3 analyses FDI performance and potential in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). The incentive policies pursued by SSA to attract FDI are analysed for 
appropriateness in section 4 and section 5 discusses the data sources and variable 
definitions. The results of the analysis are presented in section 6, and section 7 
summarises and concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Motives for FDI 
The choice of location of FDI should depend on the motivation for undertaking the 
investment activity. To attract FDI and multinational enterprise (MNE) activities, 
different types of incentives are needed to attract the different modes of FDI which are: 
natural resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking 
FDI (see Dunning 1998, table 1; Caves 1982 and 1996). 
 
For natural resource seeking FDI, according to Dunning (1998) and before him Caves 
(1996), the most important factors influencing location include the availability, costs and 
quality of natural resources and their development (i.e. processing and marketing); 
infrastructural development necessary for the exploitation of these resources and 
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availability of joint-venture partners. Investment incentives are also important in resource 
seeking FDI. 
 
Dunning (1998) and Caves (1996) also stressed that the size and growth of domestic and 
regional markets, the availability and cost of skilled labour, quality of infrastructure and 
institutional competence, agglomeration economies and service support systems, and 
macroeconomic policies of the host government particularly influence market-seeking 
FDI. 
 
In the case of efficiency-seeking FDI, these two authors, among many, believe that the 
most significant determining factors are mainly production cost-related, but most 
emphasis is placed on factors such as the skill and professional elements of labour, the 
competitiveness of related firms, the quality of local infrastructure and institutions, 
macroeconomic policies,  and  the relationship of all these with knowledge intensive FDI. 
Human resource development and the availability of specialised clusters, e.g. science and 
industrial parks, are also thought to be of increasing importance. 
 
Finally, Dunning and Caves point out that strategic asset-seeking FDI is influenced more 
by factors such as the availability of knowledge-related assets (e.g. process and product 
technology, management expertise, etc) and markets and the geographical dispersion of 
such assets, institutional and other variables influencing access to such assets by foreign 
investors, the price and availability of synergistic assets to foreign firms, and access to 
different cultures, institutions and systems. 
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FDI is important to developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), for 
several reasons that enhance development, other than supplementing domestic (savings 
and) investment. It enhances domestic innovation through the transfer of technology,  
leads to human capital development through the transfer of management skills and 
knowledge, provides market access, enhances productivity through the stimulation of 
competition in the domestic economy, and it reduces costs and improves economies of 
scale through the integration of the domestic economy with international economic 
activity.  
 
Through these advantages, the multinational enterprise (MNE), the main vehicle of FDI, 
can positively shift a country’s comparative advantage and, as a result, many SSA 
countries are now actively wooing MNE participation in their efforts at economic 
development. Policies designed to raise the level of FDI, have attempted to market the 
opportunities, raise the potential returns and reduce the obstacles and risks associated 
with FDI.  
 
The level of economic activity of MNEs depends on their primary motivation for 
undertaking foreign activity.  The investment behaviour of market-seeking firms, for 
example, depends more on the size and growth of the local or regional economy, than 
those primarily established to supply the global market. 
 
3. SSA Inward FDI Performance and Potential.  
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As already mentioned, FDI is actively sought by almost all SSA countries, because of the 
contributions that FDI can make to their economies. They have improved their 
investment climate, through major policy efforts, by liberalisation of their investment 
regulations, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the offer of incentives to foreign 
investors. Unfortunately, the expected flow of FDI to SSA has been disappointing, partly 
as a result of the negative image of the continent as a whole. 
 
In the early 1970s, Africa attracted a higher share of world FDI than Asia and Latin 
America, but by 2000, it was attracting nine times and almost six times less FDI 
respectively. This is summarised in United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2001), showing that FDI inflows to Africa slumped in 2000, 
bringing down the continent’s already low share of world FDI inflows to below 1%. In 
previous years, this figure had hardly exceeded 2%, and although in 2001, Africa’s share 
rose again to 2.3% (see table 1), the share of Africa’s FDI inflows in total inflows 
remains very low. Between 2000 and 2004, the continent received a little over an annual 
average of 2% as compared to 4.4% in the 1970s. 
 
Knowledge of a country or region is crucial in the location decision of MNEs. Inadequate 
knowledge of a location, however, can cause investors to underestimate opportunities and 
overestimate risks, pushing such locations to the periphery of the location decision-
making process. This could easily characterise many SSA countries. 
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UNCTAD in various publications have shown that market size and access to natural 
resources have been crucial determinants of FDI in SSA. This is not surprising, given that 
the SSA countries that have been able to attract any meaningful FDI have been those with 
large domestic markets and those that possess large amounts of natural and mineral 
resources (see for example UCTAD, 2002).  
 
The relationship between market size, measured by GDP, and FDI inflows shows that in 
1996-97, South Africa, followed by Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire have the largest GDP and 
hence the largest inflows of FDI. At the other extreme, Niger and Burundi, with the 
lowest GDP, attract the lowest FDI flows (see World Bank, 1999). Further, for a sample 
of 29 SSA countries, the correlation coefficient between FDI flows and market size is 
almost perfect at 0.99. 
 
In the case of natural resources, FDI inflows into SSA countries by sector show that 54% 
of FDI went to the primary sector (natural resources) in the period 1996-20001. In 1996-
97, correlation coefficient of the value of natural resources and FDI inflows stood at 0.94 
for a sample of 29 SSA countries (World Bank, 1999; UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
Apart from natural resources and market size, Morisset (2001)2, using FDI climate as the 
dependent variable, showed empirically that GDP growth rate and trade openness are 
                                                 
1 Traditionally, about 60% of FDI in Africa is allocated to oil and natural resources. According to Morisset 
(2001), SSA has large reserves of gold, diamonds and oil; half of the world’s manganese and cobalt; one-
third of bauxite and more than 80% of chromium and platinum. SSA countries are among the main 
exporters of sugar, cocoa and coffee. 
2 Morisset (2001), defines investment environment (or FDI climate) as FDIi/(GDPi*NRi), where FDI is the 
FDI inflow in country i, GDP is the gross domestic product and NR is the value of natural resources. 
 
 6
significant and positively related to the investment climate in SSA. Trade openness, being 
significant, confirms and supports the policy of trade liberalisation, now being pursued by 
the majority of SSA countries.  
 
Countries that have been able to establish a stable macroeconomic and political 
environment for a period of time, have successfully implemented trade liberalisation and 
privatisation programmes and which have adopted international treaties relating to FDI, 
tend to attract FDI in areas other than natural resources and market access. Two SSA 
countries that have improved their investment environment are Mali and Mozambique. 
These countries have attracted more FDI than Cameroon and Kenya, which have larger 
local markets and a wide range of abundant natural resources (ibid). 
 
How have SSA countries gone about creating this investment environment? Many have 
attempted to use incentives as a means of attracting FDI. This issue forms the basis of the 
next section which attempts to analyse the appropriateness of the incentives offered given 
the type (and mode) of FDI normally attracted by these countries. 
 
4. Fiscal Incentives for FDI: How Appropriate? 
There are two main perspectives on fiscal incentives. First, supporters (e.g. Bora, 2002; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003) argue that, under certain conditions, they increase 
investment, create jobs and other socio-economic benefits. Second, opponents (e.g. 
Halvorsen, 1995; Wilson, 1996; Osman, 2000; Wells et al, 2001) believe that fiscal 
incentives may not be the first-best mechanism for attracting FDI and the costs of 
 7
incentives to attract FDI outweigh the benefits. They believe that incentives may 
exacerbate problems like governance and corruption and it would be better to improve 
the local infrastructure and stabilise the macro-economy.  
 
Many LDCs, including SSA countries, have provided investment incentives to entice 
foreign MNEs to locate in their economies but have achieved little success in generating 
the expected investment flows. This experience over a number of years suggests that 
fiscal incentives have not been effective in countering factors that work against locating 
in the SSA region, such as poor physical (roads, transport and communication) and 
institutional infrastructures and macroeconomic instability. 
 
LDCs’ governments use several types of fiscal incentives that impact on the effective tax 
rates and the location decisions of MNEs. Much focus has been put on instruments that 
are connected to corporation income tax, such as tax holidays and tax allowances, 
instruments that are only helpful to profitable companies. Custom duties and local 
indirect tax exemptions also exist in many countries. Grants are used mainly in advanced 
industrial countries because they are too expensive for, and hence rarely used by, less 
developed countries (LDCs) (see table 2).  
 
According to Morrisset and Pirnia, of the foreign investment advisory service (FIAS), 
World Bank, the most popular form of incentives for several SSA countries has been tax 
holidays or temporary rebates, which provide large benefits as soon as the company 
begins to earn income. These primarily benefit short-term investments, in footloose 
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industries (such as banking, insurance, internet and general services) that can quit one 
jurisdiction quickly for another. Tax holidays also tend to benefit investment in new 
companies rather than those in existing companies and discriminate against long-term 
investments. Finally and significantly for many SSA countries, they often lead to a large 
erosion of the tax base as corporate taxpayers avoid taxation of income from other 
sources. Morisset and Pirnia (2001), claim that when taxpayers have a choice, they can 
shift income into companies that are enjoying the tax holidays and make more deductible 
expenditures in other companies they own, that must pay taxes, thus operating a kind of 
“transfer pricing” system. Furthermore, the taxpaying company may incur interest costs 
on debt financing, while the tax holiday company enjoys equity financing. In short, the 
tax holiday company could hold debt in the non-tax holiday company. 
 
The most significant question is whether fiscal incentives have ever proved attractive for 
FDI location? Bora (2002), in a study of 71 developing countries, concludes that fiscal 
incentives are the most popular form of incentive; accounting for 19 out of 29 most 
frequently used incentives. As mentioned earlier and illustrated in Table 2, most fiscal 
incentives are based on tax holidays and other instruments designed to reduce the 
effective rate of corporation tax. But such tax incentives increase investment flows only if 
projects are sensitive to differential taxation and it is very difficult in practice to correctly 
select such projects. Furthermore, in many cases, it is the most profitable, tax-insensitive 
investments that are most likely to receive incentives, even though these projects could 
have been undertaken in the absence of incentives (Halvorsen, 1995). 
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For many LDCs, particularly SSA, the bulk of FDI originates from the UK, USA, 
Germany and France; countries that provide their firms investing abroad with foreign tax 
credits.3  Therefore a lower tax rate in SSA will be directly offset by a higher rate in the 
investing country (Tanzi and Zee, 2000). As a result, fiscal incentives lose their 
attractiveness for foreign firms to increase investments since lower SSA taxes may be 
offset one-to-one in these countries. Tax incentives of this type do not increase 
investment. In fact this type of incentive only results in the transfer of revenue from SSA 
to the richer home countries (Halvorsen, 1995; Fletcher, 2002). For SSA countries in the 
period 1996-2000, 78% of all FDI inflows to Africa comes from these four countries, 
with the USA alone accounting for 37% of the total (See Table 3). 
 
There is now a need for SSA governments to reassess the value of fiscal incentives, 
especially following the UNCTAD (2005) report  on “Economic Development in Africa”, 
which shows that profit remittances in many SSA countries have in recent years 
significantly exceeded total FDI inflows. Apart from remittances, tax incentives come 
with an immediate opportunity cost in lost government revenue. The UNCTAD study 
shows that gold exports in Ghana for the period 1990-2003 rose threefold to about $893.6 
million, of which Ghana earned only about 5% in revenue.  In Tanzania, gold exports 
rose from less than 1% of export revenues in the late 1990s to over 40% in 2003. 
Between 1997 and 2002, gold export earning stood at around $890 million, with only 
about 10% going to government revenues in the form of taxes and royalties. 
 
                                                 
3 Tax credits are typically provided up to the amount that would have been paid in the home country at the 
domestic rate as if the income has been earned in the home country. 
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Attracting FDI is only a part of the story. The other is to assess the impact of such FDI on 
the wider economic and developmental gain to SSA. A balanced framework is needed, 
where governments need to weigh both country-specific and sector-specific costs and 
benefits. For example, the inflow of FDI may be a benefit, but the resulting profit 
outflows may be high enough to be a substantial cost. Thus, the anticipated benefits, in 
terms of development, that many SSA countries seek will not materialise. Fiscal 
incentives can not be seen as a “free lunch” to attract FDI, as the provision of these 
incentives is turning out to be very costly in terms of foregone revenues. 
 
We can infer from the foregoing that the significance of fiscal incentives on FDI location 
depends on: (i) the source of FDI; if the investment is from advanced economies like the 
USA, UK, France and Germany, where home firms are offered foreign tax credit, such 
incentives will have very little effect on the firms’ location decision. Most investment in 
SSA comes from these countries. (ii) The type of project; short-term, footloose 
investments, such as banking, insurance, internet, etc, benefit most from fiscal incentives, 
especially tax holidays. Most investments in SSA are long-term, such as mining and 
agricultural projects. (iii) The motivation for the investment; if investment is natural 
resource or market seeking, fiscal incentives could only be a relatively minor determinant 
of FDI inflows. More significant determinants, apart from market size and growth, are the 
cost of domestic labour and the state of local infrastructure.  
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Fiscal incentives could be a significant determinant of FDI inflows in SSA, if investment 
is efficiency seeking or strategic asset seeking, but only a few SSA countries possess 
locational factors that would attract these types of FDI, e.g. South Africa and Mauritius. 
 
With the growing pressures of international competition for FDI induced by 
globalisation, locational advantages based only on traditional factors may be insufficient 
to attract FDI. Depending on these factors, as many SSA countries do, may marginalise 
them as one of the major goals of FDI in international production is the improvement of 
efficiency. Recent studies have highlighted the need of improving and sustaining 
locational advantages through government policies, to complement traditional factors 
(Dunning, 2002). To explicitly capture the role of government policies, specifically, 
fiscal incentives, in determining the inflows of FDI in SSA, we present an empirical 
analysis in the following sections. 
 
5. The Model, Data and Variable Definitions 
For this study we utilize multiple regression analysis to determine the factors that affect 
the inflow of FDI to sub-Saharan Africa. The model is of the form: 
 
FDIit = A + αFISCALit + βXit +  εit 
 
Where FDIit is the dependent variable measuring the inflow of FDI into country i in time 
t. FISCALit is the target (policy) explanatory variable, which is proxied by different 
measures of fiscal incentives. Vector Xit represent other factors that explain the inflow of 
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FDI to SSA, such as market size and growth, physical and human infrastructure 
development, and other policy and institutional variables. εit is an error term and A is a 
constant term, which may capture the effects of other non-specified factors. 
 
A selection of 16 SSA countries for which data were available in the years 1990 to 2000 
form the sample for our analysis. The sample countries are a mixture of those that have 
traditionally attracted significant FDI and continue to do and those that have always done 
poorly. The latter could be further divided into those that have performed above 
expectations and those that have continued to perform poorly. The 16 countries are 
identified by these different categories; Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, Chad and Sudan 
are the high FDI performers; Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire have 
performed above expectations; and Botswana, Congo Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Namibia, Uganda and Zambia are the poor performers. The FDI trends for these countries 
are presented in figures 1 to 3 below. As can be seen, the majority of the sample 
countries, over the period 1970-2003, attract no more than $300M in FDI inflow. The 
poor performers, although showing an increased trend after the mid 1990s, have started 
from a very low base, whereas the low performers, performing above expectation, seem 
to have been improving since early 1990s, again starting from a low base. Their 
performance seemed to have been mainly policy-inspired. The high performers are SSA 
countries with large deposits of oil and minerals, or possess large markets. 
 
Only SSA countries are examined in this study on the grounds that the factors that 
determine the inflow of FDI to SSA are different from those that determine FDI 
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elsewhere, a view supported by Asiedu (2002) and Barta, Kaufmann and Stone (2003). 
Also, the structure and characteristics of SSA countries are different from other 
developing countries. This choice will also ensure that the results are relevant exclusively 
to SSA. 
 
This study draws its data from two primary sources: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development’s (UNCTAD) and World/African Development Indicators of the World 
Bank (WB). Data are also drawn from several other sources such as Freedom House 
(2004); World Resources Institute (2005) and International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) (2004). 
 
For this study, the dependent variable is defined as the US dollar value  of FDI inflow of 
the host SSA country. The data for this variable was drawn from the UNCTAD FDI 
database4
 
The independent variables used in this study are defined below: 
The attractiveness of the host SSA country’s market is proxied by its GDP per capita 
(GDPCAP) and GDP growth (GDPGROW), which measure market size and growth 
respectively5. They are both expected to be positive determinants of FDI size, 
particularly for the market-seeking type. 
 
                                                 
4 (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/eng/; accessed on and before 27/06/05). 
5 These two variables have been used extensively in the FDI literature and in the analysis of FDI determinants. 
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Recently, many SSA countries have attempted to open up their economies to both trade 
and investment in order to attract FDI. We therefore include in our study a proxy for 
openness, defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP, i.e. (X+M)/GDP. We expect 
that the higher is this ratio, the more open is the country and the higher will be the inflow 
of FDI. 
 
We also include a proxy for political stability as a measure of country risk, with the 
expectation that political stability will have a positive impact on FDI inflows. We 
combine, by taking a simple average rank of two indicators, political freedom and civil 
liberty, to measure political stability (PFCL). Data for this variable were drawn from 
Freedom House (2004). Each country is assigned a rating for political freedom and civil 
liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 
7, the lowest. 
 
We select three proxy variables for fiscal incentives (FISCAL) in this study. For most 
SSA countries, the most popular tax incentive offered to foreign investors is a tax holiday 
(TAXHOL). This incentive is popular because it comes with a zero initial cost. This 
proxy will assume a value of 0 if no tax holiday is offered by the authorities. For a tax 
holiday of five years or less, a value of 1 is allocated and for a tax holiday of more than 
five years, a value of 2 is allocated. We expect TAXHOL to be positively related with 
FDI inflow. 
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In recent years, many countries have begun to relax restrictions placed on the repatriation 
of profits. In this study we use the proxy REPATRI to capture the impact of this incentive 
on FDI inflows to SSA. The World Economic Forum (WEF) assigns a range of values (1-
7) depending on the level of restrictions imposed on the repatriation of profits6. A value 
of 1 means that no profit repatriation is allowed and a value of 7 means that there is no 
restriction whatsoever. The higher the value, the lower the restriction and the higher is the 
expected inflow of FDI. 
 
The third proxy for fiscal incentives is tax concessions offered to specific industries. This 
indicates whether the host governments are selective in their offer of tax concessions or 
whether these are given across the board (TAXCON). If a country offers no tax 
concession, the variable takes a value of 0. If tax incentives are declared for a limited 
number of industries, the variable takes a value of 1 and if all industries are offered tax 
incentives, then the variable takes a value of 2. We expect TAXCON to be positively 
related to FDI inflows. 
 
We select two variables for human capital in this study. Following Root and Ahmed 
(1979), we use secondary school enrolment ratio (SSER) as a measure, since it reflects 
the flow of investment in human capital in SSA and it is customary to use it in the 
empirical literature on growth (see Barro 1991)7. This flow measure does not take the 
accumulated stock of human capital in the economy into consideration. To account for 
                                                 
6 http://search.weforum.org/ , accessed on and before 15/06/05. 
7 SSER is defined as total enrolment in secondary education as a proportion of the population of secondary 
school-age according to the World Bank. 
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this stock, we use the adult illiteracy rate of the host country (ILLIT). This measure of 
labour quality is indicative of the level of education and skills of the workers within a 
country and is widely used in the literature for this reason. This measure is expected to be 
negatively related to FDI size. Coughlin and Segev (2000) for example found that the 
illiteracy rate is inversely related to the availability of relatively skilled labour, a major 
factor in the location decision of MNEs, and a statistically significant determinant of FDI. 
 
Good infrastructure is believed to increase the productivity of investments and stimulate 
FDI flows (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Morisset, 2001; Asiedu, 2002). The measure of the 
quality of infrastructure within the host country is proxied by the number of telephone 
mainlines per 1000 population (INFRA).8 It is expected that the higher the number of 
telephone mainlines, the higher the flow of FDI.9  
 
We also incorporate in our analysis the real [effective] exchange rate (REXRI) to allow 
us to determine the effect of relative wealth and relative labour costs on FDI inflows (see 
Klein and Rosengren, 1994).  A real depreciation of a country’s exchange rate would 
increase the relative wealth of foreign firms and lead to an increase in foreign purchases 
of domestic assets.  Also, a real depreciation of a country’s foreign exchange would lead 
to capital inflows as foreign countries try to take advantage of relatively cheaper 
domestic labour.  The importance of this channel can be seen from evidence presented in 
Xing and Wan (2004) for China, that points towards a strong dependence of relative 
                                                 
8 Data for this proxy were drawn from the ITU database (2004). 
9 An alternative proxy used is the number of cell phone users per 1000 population. These two are 
negatively correlated at the global level as cell phones tend to replace mainline telephones. They both tend 
to be positively correlated with FDI inflows. Data for this proxy was also drawn from ITU (2004). 
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labour costs on exchange rate movements.  We measure the real exchange rate of the host 
country as the nominal rate adjusted by the host and source countries’ GDP deflator.  An 
increase in the real exchange rate (i.e. a real depreciation of the host country's currency) 
should be expected to lead to an increase in FDI inflows.  
 
Finally, the corruption perception index (CPI) is included in the analysis to account for 
the influence of corruption on the inflow of FDI. Corruption is defined as the misuse of 
entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2004). This data is 
collected, mainly through private sector surveys, by Transparency International (TI) and 
the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group.10 In general SSA countries score quite low in 
the corruption ranking. In 2001, of our sample 16 SSA countries, only four, (Botswana 
(26), Namibia (30), South Africa (38) and Mauritius (40)) ranked below 50 out of 91 
countries. At the extremes we have Nigeria, with a CPI of 1 and Botswana, with a CPI of 
6. In 2001, Nigeria ranked 90 out of 91 countries and its position remained virtually 
unchanged in 2005, ranking 152 out of 158 (TI, 2004). For this analysis, we use the PRS 
data on corruption. Although not all SSA countries are covered by the surveys, and some 
sample countries are missing a few years, the PRS coverage of SSA countries is better 
than TI’s. The CPI is expected to have a positive relationship with FDI inflows. The 
higher the CPI (low corruption), the higher the inflow, and vice versa. 
 
To estimate the above model we use the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time wise 
autoregressive model described by White (1980). To use this model we assume that the 
                                                 
10 TI scores this variable from 10 (no corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt) and PRS scores the same way but 
from 6 to 0. 
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cross-sectional observations have regression errors that are heteroskedastic, and that the 
time-series observations are autoregressive. The estimation procedure is based on a 
transformed model where autocorrelation across time and heteroskedasticity across 
countries are taken into account in order to derive residuals, which are asymptotically 
non-autoregressive, homoskedastic and efficient.11 This allows the application of the 
OLS method using all pooled observations; 176 in total, if all data are available.12
 
6. The Empirical Findings 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 4, which shows that a 
high level of diversity exists between countries in the SSA region. For the variable, 
market size, measured by GDP per capita, SSA residents received an average of $1,020 
per head, with a high variation between countries. The highest recorded is $3,873 per 
capita, for Mauritius in 1996. Growth averaged about 3.6% per annum, with the highest 
being contributed by Tanzania (19.3%) in 1999. The average FDI flow is $240M per 
annum for all SSA countries in the sample. Again there is a wide variation between 
countries, with the highest being $3817M recorded for South Africa in 1997. In terms of 
human capital development, illiteracy levels range widely from 14% for South Africa in 
2000, to 72% for Ethiopia in 1990, with an average of 39%. The highest secondary 
school enrolment ratio is 97% for South Africa, with the average for all SSA countries 
being only 32%. Tanzania recorded the lowest ratio of 6% in the early 1990s. The most 
“open” economy as shown by the statistics is Angola in 1999, where total trade is more 
than 75% higher than GDP. At the other extreme we have Sudan, whose economy was 
                                                 
11 All econometric estimations have been performed using STATA  v.6.0 
12 There are a number of missing values for some of the variables, with the largest full set of data being 107 
observations.  
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virtually closed in the mid 1990s, with a trade ratio of 0.23 in 1997. The Infrastructure 
measure reveals an average of 25 main telephone lines per 1000 population, and ranges 
from 1 (Chad, Uganda) to 235 (Mauritius). The average corruption perception index is 
3.6, with the maximum of 6.1 for Botswana in 1999, which is the least corrupt country in 
the sample. Political stability averaged 4.4, with the index ranging from 1.5 (relatively 
free) for countries like South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana, to 7 (relatively unfree) for 
countries like Sudan and Angola. 
 
To estimate the impact of fiscal policy on FDI flows to SSA, controlling for economic 
fundamentals – market size and growth, openness of the economy, human capital, 
infrastructure development, economic and political stability and cost factors - two sets of 
models are estimated; random effect models and fixed effect models. First, however, we 
look at the association of the explanatory variables to be able to assess the most 
appropriate way of applying the data to the model specified above. 
 
Multiple correlation coefficients for the independent variables in the pooled dataset 
reveal that multicollinearity is not a problem in general (see Table 5). The highest 
correlation coefficients are between ILLIT and GDPCAP (-0.693), and ILLIT and 
INFRA (0.685), with the correlation between GDPCAP and INFRA  at 0.674. The 
variable ILLIT is dropped from some of our regression models to assess its absence on 
the overall fit of the model and on the significance of the other explanatory variables. 
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A multiple regression analysis is conducted for all 16 SSA countries for which data are 
available, for the years 1990-2000. The results of five separate regression models are 
presented in Table 6. Equation (1) reports a random effect model corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (White-corrected standard errors)13, as does 
equation (2), except that the variable ILLIT is dropped. Equation (3) is a corrected fixed 
effect model and when ILLIT is omitted, equation (4) is estimated. Equation (5) is the 
random effects model of equation (1) with the inclusion of CPI. In general, for the 
various models, the results indicate that a large part of FDI inflows into SSA can be 
explained by both fiscal (tax) policy variables and other control variables. 
 
Since there is only a small chance of a collinearity problem, the first regression (equation 
(1)) includes all explanatory variables, apart from CPI, where data are limited. For this 
model, market size and growth, secondary school enrolment ratio, openness of the 
economy, the real exchange rate and tax holiday variables explain 30% of the variation in 
FDI inflows in SSA. For a pooled cross-sectional analysis, this relationship is quite 
reasonable. 
 
Of the fiscal variables, only TAXHOL is positively significant (at the 1% level). 
REPATRI and TAXCON are insignificant in determining FDI inflows in SSA. This 
result indicates that countries that offer wide sweeping tax concessions and the 
repatriation of profits may tend not to attract the expected level of FDI. This result further 
corroborates the views of Osman (2000), Morriset and Pirnia (2001), Wells et al (2001) 
and UNCTAD (2005) that tax concessions generally fail to attract FDI. 
                                                 
13 White, H. (1980) 
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 For the control variables we see that market size and growth are significant as expected, 
given that most SSA countries seem to be attracting more market seeking and resource 
seeking FDI. Economic policies like human capital development in the form of SSER, 
openness of the economy and exchange rate adjustments are also quite significant 
determinants of FDI. SSA countries that have been able to adjust their economies along 
these lines tend to attract more FDI. 
 
Regression equation (2) reports on the random effect model with ILLIT omitted from the 
analysis.  The results reveal a slight increase in the coefficient and significance of market 
size and growth. Infrastructural development, INFRA, which was insignificant in 
equation (1) and has a relatively strong correlation with ILLIT, is now significant at the 
5% level. By dropping ILLIT the overall fit of the model is not adversely affected, and 
broad conclusions remain the same. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) report the fixed effect models, (with (4) dropping ILLIT) and the 
results show that, for both equations, market size is no longer significant, but market 
growth is now significant at the 1% level. SSA countries with relatively higher growth 
(as a result of policy reforms) tend to do better in attracting FDI compared to those 
simply possessing larger markets14. Both equations show that the wider the range of tax 
concessions offered, the lower the amount of FDI received and the variable is significant 
at the 1% level This result is contrary to the expectations of many SSA governments 
                                                 
14 In the fixed effect models, countries like Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius tend to have more significant 
impact on FDI  inflows than their larger counterparts. 
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wishing to attract larger FDI inflows by offering tax concessions. TAXHOL is no longer 
significant when country effects are taken into consideration. The removal of restrictions 
on the repatriation of profits becomes significant (at the 5% level) when ILLIT is 
removed from the model. There is some evidence therefore that removal of restrictions 
has a significant positive impact on FDI flows to SSA. Political freedom and civil liberty 
seemed to be a significant determinant of FDI inflows. Countries like Nigeria, South 
Africa and Sudan seem to feature less well in this area.  These two equations explain 
almost 60% of the variation in FDI inflows in SSA. 
 
Equation (5) incorporates the variable measuring the impact of corruption, as perceived 
by businesses, on FDI inflows.  This result may be viewed with caution, as much 
information is lost as a result of the smaller number of observations (76) for CPI.  The 
results show that CPI is positively significant at the 5% level i.e. the higher the CPI (i.e. 
the less corrupt the country is) the higher is the amount of FDI it attracts.  Countries like 
South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana have low levels of corruption and attract high 
proportions of FDI. Also, some of the most corrupt SSA countries, according to the 
index, do attract large amounts of FDI, e.g. Nigeria, presumably because of the influence 
of other factors like market size and growth and natural resources. We also see from the 
result that both proxies for human capital; SSER and ILLIT are significant at the 5% and 
10% levels respectively. This shows that both the stock and flow concepts of education 
attract FDI flows in SSA. 
 
7. Conclusions 
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This paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives to attract 
FDI to 16 SSA countries for the period 1990-2000, after controlling for the influence of 
traditional, political, institutional and other policy variables. Pooled data analysis is 
performed and the results discussed. 
 
The results of the study show that traditional factors such as large market size, good 
infrastructural development, high skills level, and relative wealth and labour costs are 
important determinants of FDI inflows. 
 
FDI policies are also found to be important determinants of FDI, e.g. openness of the 
economy. With regards to fiscal policy, our results show that tax holidays are very 
important for attracting more FDI. When country effects are taken into consideration, 
profits repatriation becomes important, so does tax concessions, but with a negatively 
significant effect on FDI flows. The results also show that the effect of institutional 
variables on FDI is important, especially a reduction in the level of corruption. 
 
The results of this study highlight the importance of  government policies in attracting 
FDI flows to SSA. They show that apart from the traditional factors, FDI policies of SSA 
governments also play an important role. Within the FDI policies ( tax incentives) 
adopted by SSA governments, it is tax holidays that matter the most. For countries 
offering too many concessions, the results show an adverse effect on FDI inflows. 
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The UNCTAD (2005) report on “Development in Africa” calls for a balanced policy 
approach to achieving growth and development, pointing to the fact that in the past, 
foreign investment steered a development path that was at odds with the needs of the 
SSA.  
 
For many SSA countries, attracting FDI has become the industrial policy of choice, with 
fiscal incentives being used as an instrument of competition. Fiscal incentives could be 
useful, but they have to be selective in terms of the motivation for investment, the source 
of investment and the type of project undertaken. Chalk (2001) proposed the following to 
rationalise a country’s fiscal incentive system for it to be able to facilitate the objectives 
of increasing government revenues and minimising the economic distortions that arise 
from the provision of fiscal incentives. A fiscal incentive system must be clear and 
simple, time-bound, performance-based, consistent with regional countries, and not 
susceptible to abuse. 
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Table 1: Distribution of World FDI Inflows, 1986-2001 (Percentage) 
Region  1986-1990 1991-1992 1993-1998 1999-2000 2001 
Developed countries 82.4 66.5 61.2 80.0 68.4 
Developing countries 17.5 31.2 35.3 17.9 27.9 
Africa  1.8 2.2 1.8 0.8 2.3 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.1 2.2 3.5 2.0 3.7 
Source: UNCTAD (2002). 
 
 
Table 2: Types of Incentives Used by Region 
Region/  
Major 
incentives 
(Countries) 
Africa 
(23) 
Asia 
(17) 
Latin America 
&Caribbean 
(12) 
Central & 
Eastern Europe 
(25) 
Western 
Europe 
(20) 
Other 
Countries 
(6) 
Total 
(103) 
Tax Holidays 16 13 8 19 7 4 67 
Accelerated 
Depreciation 
6 8 6 12 10 5 47 
Investment 
Allowances 
4 5 9 3 5  26 
Import duty 
Exemption 
15 13 11 13 7 4 63 
Duty Drawback 10 
 
8 10 12 6 3 49 
Source: UNCTAD, 1995 
 
Table 3: Sources of FDI inflows to Africa, 1996-2000 (%) 
Country 1996-2000 
United States 37 
France 18 
United Kingdom 13 
Germany 10 
Netherlands 3 
Italy 3 
Spain 2 
Belgium 2 
Others 12 
Source: Estimated from UNCTAD (2002)  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables; 1990-2000. 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
     FDI 176 239.7455 466.9736  -335 3817   
  TAXCON 1176 1.552 1.328691 0 2   
  TAXHOL    176 .9415584 .8873623 0 2   
 REPATRI 176 5.254545 .9686408 3.2 7   
    PFCL 176 4.386364 1.673708 1.5 7   
   INFRA 176 25.21023 43.88525 1 235   
   REXRI 176 85.84841 34.1738 19.9 203.6   
  GDPCAP 176 1020.625 1114.873 92 3873   
GDPGROW 176 3.553977 4.489503 -24.7 19.3   
    SSER 1176 32.13772 24.75736 6 97   
   ILLIT 176 38.93333 17.12228 14 72   
  XM_GDP 176 .6882955 .3867822 0.23 1.79   
     CPI   98  3.0 1.0 1  5   
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients of the Independent Variables. 
 GDPCAP GDPGROW SSER ILLIT XM_GDP INFRA PFCL REXRI REPATRI TAXHOL TAXCON
GDPCAP 1.000           
GDPGROW 0.020 1.000          
SSER 0.606 -0.068 1.000         
ILLIT -0.693 -0.140 -0.438 1.000        
XM_GDP 0.294 0.144 0.337 -0.486 1.000       
INFRA 0.674 0.032 0.517 -0.685 0.183 1.000      
PFCL -0.454 -0.187 -0.441 0.685 -0.504 -0.664 1.000     
REXRI 0.207 -0.094 0.172 -0.359 -0.055 -0.007 -0.033 1.000    
REPATRI 0.390 0.249 0.303 -0.375 0.056 0.358 -0.520 0.081 1.000   
TAXHOL -0.404 -0.134 -0.360 0.525 0.000 -0.326 0.506 -0.267 -0.687 1.000  
TAXCON -0.146 -0.081 -0.144 0.157 -0.041 -0.143 0.216 -0.050 -0.230 0.405 1.000
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Table 6: Linear  Regression with White-corrected standard errors in the presence of 
heteroscedasticy. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
GDPCAP 0.26** 
(2.42) 
0.28*** 
(3.01) 
0.41 
(0.42) 
0.42 
(0.88) 
-0.44 
(-0.570) 
GDPGROW 13.49* 
(1.72) 
15.71** 
(2.05) 
7.76*** 
(2.53) 
7.92*** 
(2.58) 
-9.65 
(-0.64) 
SSER 10.26*** 
(2.68) 
11.54*** 
(3.14) 
3.84 
(0.79) 
3.61 
(0.75) 
20.91** 
(2.29) 
ILLIT  -3.99 
(-0.97) 
 -4.23 
(-0.23) 
 33.37** 
(1.97) 
XM_GDP 623.14*** 
(2.51) 
538.37** 
(2.25) 
191.65 
(0.90) 
198.13 
(0.94) 
-488.13 
(-1.41) 
INFRA 3.98 
(1.46)  
4.87** 
(2.02) 
0.63 
(0.19) 
0.53 
(0.17) 
10.86 
(1.15) 
PFCL -46.24 
(-0.68) 
-48.09 
(-0.72) 
-151.58 
(-1.71) 
-153.88* 
(1.91) 
-295.32 
(-1.14) 
REXRI 4.94** 
(2.05) 
5.88*** 
(2.87) 
4.20 
(1.95) 
4.16** 
(1.95) 
13.77** 
(2.43) 
REPATRI 74.27 
(0.87) 
68.40 
(0.81) 
132.33 
(0.75) 
171.68** 
(2.05) 
-58.71 
(-0.51) 
TAXHOL 274.18*** 
(2.84) 
244.69*** 
(2.83) 
33.81 
(0.73) 
35.10 
(0.81) 
18.58 
(0.36) 
TAXCON -22.3 
(-1.22) 
-17.33 
(-1.41) 
-25.52*** 
(-2.58) 
-25.37*** 
(2.55) 
100.43 
(1.46) 
CPI     311.71** 
(1.98) 
CONSTANT -238 
(-0.26) 
-524.66 
(-0.60) 
-733.01 
(-0.60) 
-349.92 
(-0.46) 
235.16 
(0.31) 
Observation 107 107 107 107 76 
R-squared 0.30 0.28 0.57 0.57 0.55 
Adjusted R-squared (OLS) 0.21 0.21 0.45 0.45 0.37 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. *** denoted significance at 1%, ** at 5% and 
* at 10%. 
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FIGURE 1: HIGH FDI PERFORMERS
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FIGURE 2: LOW FDI PERFORMERS; PERFORMING ABOVE EXPECTATION
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FIGURE 3: LOW FDI  PERFORMERS
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Source: Data drawn from UNCTAD FDI database at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/eng/; accessed on and before 
27/06/05 
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Appendix: key determinants of FDI by Selected SSA Countries 
 
Source: Adapted from Basu and Srinivasan (2002) 
 Selected SSA Countries 
Key Determinants Bots
wana 
Lesot
ho 
Maur
itius 
Mozam
bique 
Nami
bia 
Swazi
land 
Ugan
da 
Political Stability/Good Governance √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Macroeconomic Stability/Economic Reform √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Cheap and Skilled Labour Force √ √ √   √  
Market Access to Neighbouring State  SA   SA SA  
Tax Incentives, Investment Promotion, EPZ √ √ EPZ √  √  
Investment Protection, Property Rights    √ √  √ 
Privatisation    √   √ 
Profit and Dividend Remittances    √   √ 
Relaxation of Capital Control        
Good Quality Infrastructure √  √  √   
Preferential Access to EU and US Markets        
Availability of Natural Resources √    √   
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